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Introduction 
How parties of the right represent women voters is a puzzle with many moving parts. A convincing 
account must include the three key elements of political representation in party democracies: the 
ideology and behaviour of parties; their representatives; and their voters. It is unlikely that any 
single piece of research could credibly capture all of these elements together but cumulatively the 
articles in this special issue seek a holistic description. In our contribution we isolate two 
components of the political representation triadic (Norton and Wood 1993); party (ideology) and 
voter (behaviour). Analysis of the linkages between these two constituents nonetheless requires the 
integration of several disparate but related literatures. The expanding research on party behaviour 
and debates concerning the extent to which parties of the right can ever truly represent the 
‘interests of women’ (Celis and Childs 2011; Celis and Childs 2014a; Celis et al. 2014) is related, if 
often only implicitly, with the literature concerning the presence or absence of a demand by parties 
of the right for women voters’ votes. The literature that focuses specifically on gender and voting for 
parties of the right largely seeks to understand why the increasing support for populist radical right 
parties, mainly in Europei, is driven more by men than women (e.g. Akkerman, de Lange and 
Rooduijn 2016; Harteveld et al 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015, 2017). Alongside this literature is a 
vast body of research on the ‘modern gender gap’ which seeks to explain women’s movement to 
support parties of the left in many Western democracies, but also explores why women historically 
supported parties of the right in greater numbers than men and whether they continue to do so in 
more traditional societies. 
In this article we attempt to combine these approaches by conducting a two-stage 
exploratory analysis using expert and voter survey data. First, we map the ideological positions of 
parties of the right in terms of gender ideology across Western Europe to establish the extent to 
which there is a common approach to gender equality or a common theme in the way parties of the 
right seek to represent the interests of women. Second, we explore whether rightist parties differ in 
their ability to recruit women’s votes.  
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Party ideology 
The assumption that the representation of women was the task of leftist parties was implicit within 
much gender and politics scholarship (Celis and Childs 2011; Celis and Childs 2014a). In fact and to a 
large extent, feminist thought operated on the basis that conservatism and feminism were mutually 
exclusive (Erzeel, Celis and Caluwaerts 2014). Certainly research shows that rightist parties more 
often than leftist parties make anti-feminist claims (Celis 2006; Erzeel, Celis and Caluwaerts 2014; 
Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Wängnerud 2000) but there is evidence that some rightist parties 
(particularly in the UK and Germany) advocate at least on some occasions feminist ideas (Bryson and 
Heppell 2010; Campbell and Childs 2015; Childs and Webb 2012; Kittilson 2006; Wiliarty 2010).  
Karen Celis and Sarah Childs explore whether non-feminist claims to represent women, i.e. attempts 
to promote traditional gender roles, might still be defined as substantively representing women if 
identifiable groups of women support these policies and as such they disavow a feminist application 
of a theory of false consciousness (Celis and Childs 2014b). However, even if the assumption that the 
substantive representation of women requires challenging traditional roles is retained, it is not 
obvious that rightist parties will inevitably espouse anti-feminist ideologies. Here we undertake an 
empirical investigation of the extent to which rightist parties represent feminist ideology and 
whether this varies across mainstream rightist parties and parties of the populist radical right in 
Western Europe.  
 In order to unpack how such parties might seek to represent women voters we need to 
define the varieties of rightist ideology that parties espouse, and how these in turn impact (1) the 
amount of attention parties give to gender issues and (2) in what direction (feminist or other). Celis 
and Childs outline how differences in rightist thought have varying implications for the 
representation of women (Celis and Childs 2014b: 7); they differentiate between social/moral 
conservatism and economic liberalism/conservatism and argue that morally conservative rightist 
parties are likely to espouse a more traditional view of gender roles than rightist liberal parties. In 
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the same vein, (Erzeel and Celis 2015) find that rightist parties’ positioning on postmaterialist issues 
was a far better predictor of the amount of attention they give to gender issues than their stance on 
socio-economic issues, because gender equality concerns fit within a larger package of 
postmaterialist issues that appeared on the political agenda in the 1970s (see also Inglehart and 
Norris 2003). Furthermore, various contributions to this special issue describe varieties of 
conservatism and suggests that all can be present in one rightist party (such as the Republican party 
in the United States) or might be more diffusely spread across a number of parties in a multiparty 
system (for example in the Netherlands the CDA might be described as morally conservative, the 
VVD liberal conservative and the PVV nationalist conservative). Thus, there is a potential relationship 
between varieties of conservatism and gender ideology whereby parties of the right might vary in 
their attitudes to gender equality. Parties’ gender ideologies are likely to vary according to their 
economic, moral and populist ideologies; in the first half of the empirical sections in this article we 
attempt to map the extent to which this is the case in Western Europe.  
Voting behaviour 
Studies of the ‘Gender Gap’ 
Early studies of ‘gender’ii and voting behaviour, Herbert Tingsten’s (1937) Political Behavior and 
Maurice Duverger’s (1955) The Political Role of Women, both concluded that women were more 
likely to support rightist parties than men. This trend is often described as the traditional gender gap 
(à la Norris 1999). However, since the emergence of the high profile ‘modern’ gender gap in US 
presidential elections in the 1980s (where more women than men supported the Democratic 
candidate) the emphasis has shifted from explaining women’s support for parties of the right to 
parties of the left. Early studies of the ‘modern’ gender gap in the United States gave serious 
attention to political explanations for gender differences in vote choice (Bonk 1988; Mueller 1988a; 
Mueller 1988b), but subsequent gender gap literature has focused largely on sociological accounts 
(notable exceptions include: Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015). 
We argue that the emphasis on sociological factors in studies of the gender gap has led researchers 
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to overlook ideological differences between the parties that might help explain why some parties of 
the right remain attractive to women whilst others do not. Recent studies of the populist radical 
right have brought the political dimension back in but as yet these insights have only rarely been 
applied to gender gaps in voting behaviour more broadly.  
By far the most influential theoretical account of gender and voting in global perspective has 
been Inglehart and Norris’ (2000) global gender gap thesis. They argue that as women have shifted 
from domestic life into higher education and paid employment their political preferences have 
moved from an emphasis on traditional values to a demand for more state support for combining 
work and family life - in the form of social spending on welfare, childcare and education - which has 
driven them away from supporting parties of the right. Inglehart and Norris’ thesis is an important 
and valuable contribution to our understanding of the impact of gender on voting behaviour in 
international perspective, but to some extent it sidesteps the issue of party politics. Inglehart and 
Norris use a straightforward left-right classification of parties to assess the extent to which women 
in ‘traditional societies’ (where women are not well represented in higher education and paid 
employment) vote to the right of men and in ‘modern societies’ (where there has been a 
transformation in gender roles) women vote to the left of men. There are various anomalies that do 
not fit within the global gender gap narrative – although Inglehart and Norris do find a large number 
of cases that are in keeping with the expectations of the theoretical model – and we question 
whether these anomalies might be accounted for by drawing party behaviour, particularly ideology, 
back into accounts of why women might choose to support parties of the right.  
It is now well established that there is substantial variation in the gender gap in party 
support across the globe and within the EU (Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014; Giger 2009; Inglehart 
and Norris 2000). Attempts to explain this variation have found mixed results, with the impact of 
individual-level and structural factors fluctuating, apparently erratically, from context to context 
(Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe 2013). We hypothesise that the seemingly inexplicable shifting 
in the power of explanatory factors might be explained by the mediating role of variations in party 
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ideology, with this impacting on women’s support for parties of the right (Campbell 2016). The 
immense transformation of gender roles in Western democracies likely provides the most solid 
foundations for understanding changes in women’s political preferences, but how these translate 
into party support or voting behaviour has been, we contend, under theorised (Campbell 2016; 
Gillion, Ladd and Meredith 2014). Accordingly, we explore in the second half of the empirical 
analyses whether variations in the political ideologies of parties of the right can help to explain 
gender variations in support for these parties across Western Europe.  
Studies of the Populist Radical Right (PRR) 
One of the most consistent findings in studies of the populist radical right (PRR) is that these parties 
tend to gain a disproportionate share of their support from men (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Betz 
1993; Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe 2013; Kitschelt 1997; Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 
2002; Norris 2005). However, we should note that the extent in the gender gap in support for PRR 
parties varies considerably and is sometimes overstated (Mayer 2015; Spierings and Zaslove 2015; 
Spierings and Zaslove 2017). The literature has principally attempted to explain gender differences in 
support for PRR parties by drawing on structural explanations for the sociological bases of PRR 
support. A structural account emphasises the fact that working-class men are disproportionately 
among the losers in the post-industrial nation states of contemporary Europe and are therefore 
more likely to be drawn to PRR parties than women. There are many more men among the blue 
collar workers, whose financial prospects have diminished as the result of the shift from manual to 
service sector employment, than women who are more often employed in the service sector (Ford 
and Goodwin 2014). If structural differences in men and women’s employment do in fact account for 
the gender gap in the support for radical right parties then we would expect the gender gap to 
disappear when measures of employment type are included in analyses. However, Terri Givens 
argues that the gender gap in votes for the radical right cannot be simply explained away by 
controlling for structural factors (Givens 2004); she finds considerable variation by country finding 
only a negligible gender gap in Denmark compared with a much larger gap in France and Norway. In 
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their study of 12 nations Tim Immerzeel et al. also find considerable variation in the radical right 
gender gap by country and the extent to which individual level (structural explanations) or 
contextual level (political explanations) helped to explain the variations in the gender gap 
(Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe 2013). Immerzeel et al. utilise contextual level factors such as 
the age and popularity of the party and its outsider status in their analysis. In a similar vein, Mudde 
(2007) argues that women, because they have lower levels of political efficacy, are less likely to vote 
for new or radical parties. We hypothesise that party gender ideology is also likely to be a crucial 
factor for explaining gender differences in support for parties of the PRR; we expect parties that 
adopt more traditional gender ideologies to secure proportionately fewer votes from women than 
parties who adopt feminist gender ideologies. 
 The lack of systematic analysis of the link between structural explanations (demand-side 
accounts) and political explanations such as the ideological positioning of parties and the behaviour 
of their leadership (supply-side accounts) is addressed in the special issue on gender and populist 
radical-right politics of Patterns of Prejudice (Spierings et al. 2015). The authors question whether 
gender plays a significant part in the platforms of PRR parties and whether this has changed over 
time. Historically parties on the populist radical right (PRR) have been associated with traditional 
attitudes to gender roles as a result of a nativist emphasis on the role of women as mothers. 
However, in the post-9/11 era there has been a shift in the discourse of much of the PRR, 
particularly in Northern Europe, to a focus on islamophobia and the portrayal of Muslim immigrants 
as a threat to liberal values including gender equality (Akkerman 2015; de Lange and Mügge 2015). 
As such we might expect there to be increasing variation in the gender ideology of PRR parties and 
some may in fact espouse positions on gender equality that are equally or even more feminist than 
more mainstream rightist parties. Sarah de Lange and Liza Mügge argue that political scientists have 
underestimated the variation in the gender ideologies of PRR parties: they find that not only 
neoliberal PRR but also some nationalist populist parties adopt modern views on gender equality (de 
Lange and Mügge 2015: 19). Here, we extend de Lange and Mügge’s study of the Netherlands and 
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Flanders and map the gender ideologies of mainstream rightist and PRR parties across 13 Western 
European nations to establish whether PRR parties are more traditional in their attitudes to gender 
equality compared with mainstream rightist parties.  
 The literature on the PRR has moreover largely operated as though support for these parties 
is deviant. Yet, recent studies argue that this may be mistaken and that the explanations for the 
gender gap for support of the PRR mirrors support for rightist parties more generally (Spierings and 
Zaslove 2015). If this analysis is correct then the sources of the modern gender gap ought to explain 
the PRR gender gap equally well. We therefore explore whether gender differences in support for 
parties of the right apply across both mainstream rightist parties and PRR parties, or whether there 
is a split with parties of the PRR being particularly attractive to men.   
Method 
Measuring Ideology 
Ideologies are belief systems that are shared by members of a particular group (Van Dijk 2006: 116). 
Variations in political ideology will only lead to gender gaps in party support if, on average, men and 
women hold different ideological positions. However, we know from the extensive gender gap 
literature that there have been fairly consistent gender differences in ideology across time and 
place. For example, Gillion et al. (2014) contend that party ideological polarisation provides a more 
persuasive account of the emergence of the modern gender gap in the United States (where more 
women than men support democratic party candidates) than either the gender realignment thesis, 
or other accounts that focus on women’s changing position in society. They argue that because 
gender differences in political attitudes and preferences predated the gender gap and have 
remained relatively stable they are unlikely drivers of the variation in the gender gap. They find that 
in the US policy preferences have become more closely associated with partisanship over time; this 
suggests that the gender gap in party support is driven by party polarisation in ideology. In this paper 
we attempt to operationalise political ideology in a comparative study of Western European 
democracies, not using respondents’ own assessments of party ideology (à la Gillion et al.) but 
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external measures of party ideology collected from expert surveys. The use of external measures of 
ideology allows us to avoid endogeneity problems that may occur should respondents to voter 
surveys retrospectively align their policy preferences, judgements of party positions and vote choice 
and is thus is a complement to Gillion et al’s innovative approach.  
 Our measures of party ideology include socialist/laissez-faire (economic), GAL/TAN 
(green/alternative/libertarian versus traditional/ authoritarian/nationalist) (Bakker et al. 2015), and 
traditional/feminist attitudes to gender roles (gender) ideologies. Economic and moral ideologies 
have wide resonance, which might help to explain the attitudes of the majority of the population. 
Gender ideology on the other hand is likely to be highly salient to a subset of the population, who 
espouse a feminist gender ideology.iii We include measures of economic and moral ideology because 
of their salience in the gender gap literature and within the literature on rightist parties’ 
representation of women. Both literatures suggest that left-leaning economic ideology is likely to be 
associated with women’s support for parties of the left but a right-leaning moral ideology is likely to 
be associated with support for traditional gender roles.  
Expert survey 
There are multiple possible methods for assessing the positions parties take in ideological space 
including: analysis of manifestos, roll-call voting, television debates, leaders’ speeches, voter 
evaluations and expert judgements (Bakker et al. 2015). Making use of expert judgements by 
conducting an expert survey is an efficient means for gathering data on a large number of parties 
that is not dependent on the variation in quality of either party manifestos, their representation in 
legislatures or voter knowledge (Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et al. 2010; Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield 2009). Furthermore, there is a lack of high quality comparative data on parties’ positions 
on gender equality. The comparative manifestos project (CMP) includes a measure of family values 
and one on 'equality' but both do not measure gender equality per se. The family values item is very 
general and measures moral conservatism rather than feminist values. The item on equality 
measures equality in general and the protection of 'underprivileged groups' but again not gender 
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equality specifically. The use of an expert survey is a good alternative to manifesto data in the 
context of this exploratory paper. Peter Mair described the results of expert surveys as a synthesis of 
parties’ past behaviour, policy programmes, ideologies and elite and mass assessments filtered 
through the perceptions of the expert; as such he considered expert surveys to provide a quick and 
relatively easy short cut for gathering party position data (Mair 2001). One of the potential 
weaknesses of expert surveys described by Mair was the difficulty experts face when locating parties 
on policy domains that are not particularly salient for that party. Whilst this is a potential criticism of 
expert surveys with a broad remit we believe it to be an argument in support of their use in the case 
of attempting to measure parties’ positions on gender equality. In the main gender equality is not 
one of the most critical axes used to describe party competition in the study of comparative politics. 
As such attitudes to gender equality represent just the kind of auxiliary axis that might be miscoded 
in a general expert survey and warrants a separate set of expert judgements from gender and 
politics scholars. Gender and politics is a subfield of political science and as such there are fewer 
gender and party politics scholars available to participate in an expert survey, with rich country 
knowledge, than would exist for a more general survey. Therefore, we rely on smaller sample sizes 
than is ideally described in the expert survey literature. However, the debate in the expert survey 
literature also suggests that expert surveys are less reliable when experts are not confident in their 
judgements which leads to seemingly random fluctuation in scores. As such we would argue that 
relying on the expert judgement of a smaller number of confident experts is likely to produce more 
reliable results than expanding the data collection exercise. We utilise data from an original expert 
survey of gender and politics scholars in order to capture the parties’ positions on gender equality 
and add it to publically available data from the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES, Bakker et al. 
2015) on socialist/laissez-faire and liberal/authoritarian ideology. Future research should collate 
information on party position from a range of sources to test whether the findings from the gender 
expert survey can be replicated. 
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 For our gender and politics expert survey we compiled a master list of 173 experts in gender 
and politics in 15 Western European Countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom).iv We included experts in our list if they had published on gender and party politics 
in the specified country or if they were recommended to us by experts in the field. In total 83 (48%) 
experts participated in the survey giving us an average number of 5 respondents per country (the 
country coverage is set out in table 1 below). We set a minimum number of experts of 3 per country, 
this is two lower than recommended in the expert survey literature (Huber and Inglehart 1995), but 
allowed us to retain France and Portugalv in the analysis which we felt was critical to maintain good 
country coverage. In this article, however, we do not include Norway and Switzerland because these 
countries were not included in the European Election Study (see below).  
 In order to maximise response rates we kept our survey to just four items.vi The first three 
items measure the parties’ positions on gender equality and the fourth item asks respondents to 
place the parties on a general left-right scale. In order to ensure that all of the experts employed the 
same political party concept we asked them to “reflect on the general position of the national 
leadership of the parties, not on the position of the party base or local parties” (Budge 2000; 
Steenbergen and Marks 2007). The survey elicited contemporaneous judgements of party positions 
to avoid the difficulties associated with asking survey respondents to make retrospective 
judgements (Steenbergen and Marks 2007: 349). 
Table 1 about here 
Each party included in the survey was categorized as either ‘left’ or ‘right’ based on the party’s 
European Parliament political group affiliation. Parties belonging to the ‘Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament’, the ‘Confederal Group of the 
European United Left – Nordic Green Left’ and the ‘Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance’ 
were categorized as ‘left’, parties belonging to other political groups were categorized as ‘right’. 
Within the group of rightist parties we make an additional distinction between ‘populist’ and ‘non-
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populist’ parties. The classification of populist parties is based on Mudde (2013) and includes the 
following parties: Austrian Freedom Party (Austria), Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria), 
Flemish Interest (Belgium), Danish People’s Party (Denmark), National Front (France), Northern 
League (Italy), Party for Freedom (Netherlands), Sweden Democrats (Sweden) and British National 
Party (BNP). In addition, we also consider the True Finns (Finland) a populist party (Spierings and 
Zaslove, 2017; Van Kessel 2015). Non-populist parties include, among others, Christian democratic, 
conservative and liberal parties. 
In order to measure the economic and moral ideological positions of parties in more detail, 
we use publicly available data from the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES; Bakker et al. 2015). 
Economic ideology classifies parties based on whether “parties want government to play an active 
role in the economy” (left) or “parties emphasize a reduced economic role for government: 
privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state” 
(right). Moral ideology classifies parties based on whether they “favour expanded personal 
freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater 
democratic participation” (libertarian) or whether they “reject these ideas, they value order, 
tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social 
and cultural issues” (authoritarian) (Bakker et al 2015: 144). For each question, country experts 
positioned parties on a 11-point left-right scale with ‘0’ implying a left/libertarian position, ‘5’ a 
centre position and ‘10’ a right/authoritarian position. 
Voter survey 
In the final part of the empirical analysis, information on party and gender ideology from the expert 
survey is linked to voting behaviour. In order to measure voting behaviour, we use data from the 
2014 European Election Study (EES) (EES 2014; Popa et al 2015). The EES survey is a post-election 
survey that includes representative national samples of the population (aged 18 or oldervii) in all EU 
member states. The EES data are very useful for this particular paper because data were collected in 
May and June 2014viii. This timing was close to that of the gender expert survey in 2015, which 
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maximizes the comparability of data and parties across the two surveys. The EES uses a standardized 
questionnaire that was identical in the various member states (albeit translated to the appropriate 
national language). The sample size in each country is approximately 1100 interviews. In this paper, 
we focus only on the 13 West European countries that are also covered in the gender expert 
surveyix. Response rates in the countries under study range between 38 per cent (Netherlands) and 
84 per cent (Portugal) (Popa et al 2015; see Appendix for response rates for all countries).x 
The EES includes different vote choice variables. Here, we use the following 
question/variable on voting intentions: ‘If there were a general election tomorrow, which party 
would you vote for?’. We use a question on future voting intentions rather than past voting 
behaviour because in some countries the last parliamentary elections took place well before 2014. 
Asking participants to recall past voting behaviour is always delicate. In order not to jeopardize the 
validity of the results, we therefore decided to focus on vote intentions which were measured at the 
same point in time for all countriesxi. The models predict party choice, with voters’ gender as the 
only independent variable. In each model, a number of control variables are added that might 
influence party choice, including respondents’ marital status (dummy married/non-married), 
employment (dummy paid employment/no paid employment), age (categorical, 16/18-39, 40-54, 
55+), political efficacy (scale 1-4, with high levels showing low efficacyxii) and political interest (scale 
1-4, with high levels showing low interestxiii). 
 
Analysis 
Part I: Mapping the ideological positions of parties of the right on gender ideology across Western 
Europe 
Figure 1 shows the mean gender role ideology scores of rightist, PRR and leftist parties across the 13 
countries in our analysis. Our gender equality experts were asked to place the parties on a 0-10 scale 
where 0 represents the view that ‘women should have an equal role with men in running business, 
industry and government’ and 10 that ‘a woman’s place is in the home’. There is a great deal of 
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variation in the gender ideologies espoused by parties of the right in Western Europe. In fact, the 
mean is for rightist parties below five showing that the parties were on average judged slightly more 
feminist than traditional in their gender role ideologies and the mean score for PRR parties was 6- 
slightly more traditional than feminist on average. For leftist parties the mean was 1 indicating that 
on average our experts rated leftist parties as highly feminist.  Among rightist parties the lowest 
score was 0 and the highest 10 demonstrating that parties of the right in Europe can be classified 
across the full spectrum of gender role ideology. Thus, we cannot see a single narrative whereby 
parties of the right adopt anti-feminist gender ideologies. Given the spread of gender ideology 
among rightist parties it is conceivable that variations in gender gaps in support for parties of the 
right might be explained by variations in party ideology. The PRR parties with the most traditional 
gender role ideologies were found in Belgium, Germany, Austria and France - all with means above 
seven. The only country with a PRR party with a feminist gender ideology score (i.e. below 5) was the 
Netherlands, and in Sweden the mean was 5 indicating a neutral (neither feminist nor traditional 
gender ideology). This is in keeping with the PRR literature, which identifies a shift in the narrative in 
Northern Europe that deliberately conflates anti-immigrant/anti-muslim sentiment with feminism 
(Meret and Siim 2013).xiv 
Figure 1 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows the correlation between gender ideology, economic ideology and 
liberal/authoritarian ideology (measured using gal/tan). It is clear that there is a closer relationship 
between liberal/authoritarian ideology and gender ideology (Pearson R of .846**) than between 
economic and gender ideology (Pearson R of .572**); this relationship is to be expected given the 
association between authoritarian attitudes and attitudes to gender roles which are both strongly 
related to religiosity. It is clear from figure 2 that there is both a distinctive pattern with parties of 
the left espousing more liberal and feminist ideologies than parties of the right and that parties of 
the PRR are predominately found in the top right-hand corner (the most authoritarian and least 
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feminist). Even so, there is considerable variation within party types with a good number of 
mainstream parties of the right occupying the same ideological space on gender equality and 
liberalism as leftist parties. This data provides, then, evidence that although the general trend for 
leftist parties to be more feminist and liberal than parties of the right remains, there is considerable 
competition between parties of the left and right in this ideological space. On this basis we might 
suggest that this constitutes evidence of attempts by some rightist parties to represent feminist 
women with feminist policies.  
The relationship between economic ideology and gender ideology is considerably weaker. 
There are a large number of parties of the mainstream right who espouse both a feminist gender 
ideology and rightist economic positions; this provides us with evidence of how a feminist gender 
ideology can be accommodated by laissez-faire economic ideology, as discussed in the introduction 
to this article.  The extent to which these parties are willing to deploy the apparatus of the state to 
transform gender roles is not evident here but we can see that feminism and conservatism are not 
mutually exclusive at least in terms of rhetorical commitment. 
Thus far we have described patterns in parties’ ideologies without attempting to develop 
explanatory accounts of the data. In order to begin to see how different party ideologies structure 
gender ideology, we conduct a (limited) linear regression in Table 2. Due to the small number of 
cases, the number of independent variables is limited to three: economic socialist/laissez-faire 
ideology, liberal/authoritarian ideology, and a dummy distinguishing between populist and non-
populist parties. Again, the analysis confirms that rightist parties’ liberal/authoritarian ideology is a 
stronger predictor for the gender ideology of parties than their economic ideology. Only the 
parameter for liberal/authoritarian ideology displays a significant effect, showing that parties 
become more traditional in their gender stance when they adopt a more authoritarian ideology. On 
the other hand, parties’ economic ideology does no longer shape their gender ideology after 
controlling for the other variables. It is parties’ stance on moral issues and not parties’ economic 
ideology that structures their gender ideology. 
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Part II: Do parties of the right differ in their ability to recruit women voters?  
The second part of the empirical analysis connects data on party ideology and gender ideology to 
data on voting behaviour. The goal is to see whether parties, and rightist parties in particular, differ 
in their ability to attract the electoral support of women voters.  
Figure 3 shows a histogram of the percentages of women voters in the electorate of leftist 
and rightist parties using data on party choice from the European Election Study (see above)xv. 
Overall, the mean percentage of women voters in the electorate of leftist parties (mean score of 
49.4% female voters) is very similar to that of rightist parties (mean score of 48.5% female voters). A 
country by country comparison (not shown here) also revealed that left/right differences in female 
vote support are absent in most countries. Differences are the largest in Denmark, where left parties 
have on average 57% of female voters and right parties 43.4%, but these differences are not 
statistically significant. Hence, rightist parties are not any different from leftist parties when it comes 
to their ability to recruit female voters. Moreover, the fact that the percentage of women voters for 
rightist parties fluctuates from 27.3% to 75% indicates that the electoral success of at least some 
rightist parties depends heavily on the electoral support of women. 
Figure 3 about here 
Next, we disaggregate the results, Figure 4 compares the percentage of women voters in the 
electorate of the populist right and the non-populist right. In most countries –except Italy and the 
UKxvi– the percentage of women voters is higher among non-populist than among populist right 
parties, confirming the populist radical right gender gap. Especially in Sweden, France and Finland 
women form a minority of the populist right electorate (corresponding with 21.1%, 30.6%, 32.4% 
and 34.7% of women voters respectively). But in Austria and the Netherlands, the populist 
electorate is more gender-balanced. These findings confirm recent studies suggesting that the 
gender gap in populist radical right voting is not universal (Spierings and Zaslove 2015) and/or might 
be closing over time (Mayer 2015). 
Figure 4 about here 
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In order to understand variation in the electoral support rightist parties receive from women, it is 
however not only important to look at differences between populist and non-populist parties. The 
role of gender ideology should also be addressed. In order to do so, we estimate a model of vote 
choice in Table 3. Given the diversity in parties within one country and given the differences in 
parties between countries, we are unable to use ‘party choice’ as the outcome variable. We 
therefore opted to create a categorical variable as our outcome variable. The outcome variable 
groups parties according to their party ideology (left/right) and gender ideology 
(feminist/traditionalxvii), thus distinguishing between (1) left parties with feminist gender ideologies, 
(2) left parties with traditional gender ideologies, (3) right parties with feminist gender ideologies 
and (4) right parties with traditional gender ideologies. The second category (left parties with 
traditional gender ideologies) is empty and is therefore not included in Table 3. The reference 
category is ‘right parties with traditional gender ideologies. Voters’ gender is the independent 
variable in the model, so we assess to what extent voters’ gender influences the probability that a 
voter votes for a party in one of the categories of the dependent variables. We control for 
respondents’ marital status, paid employment, age, political efficacy and political interest. In order 
to control for institutional variation between countries, we added country fixed effects. 
Table 3 predicts voters’ choice for a right party with a traditional gender ideology. The 
results indicate that, after controlling for third variables, the ‘gender’ variable remains statistically 
significant for both outcome categories. Women are more likely than men to vote for a left party 
with a feminist gender ideology compared to a right party with a traditional gender ideology. A 
calculation of the odds ratio (Exp(B)= 1.469) indicates that the odds that women make that choice is 
1.5 times greater than men making that choice. This again confirms the ‘modern gender gap’. 
Interestingly, women are also more likely to vote for a right party with a feminist gender ideology 
(Exp(B)=1.326), compared to a party with a traditional gender ideology. This shows that the position 
rightist parties take on gender issues influences the party’s level of support among women voters. In 
particular, rightist parties who adopt a more feminist stance on gender issues are able to attract 
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more women voters than rightist parties with a more traditional gender view. It is mostly centre 
right parties who adopt a more feminist position on gender issues in their public stance and who 
also have a majority of female voters amongst their electorate. Examples are the Christian 
democratic parties CD&V in Belgium and Kristdemokraterna in Sweden, and the liberal parties 
Centerpartiet in Sweden and Swedish People’s Party of Finland. These two liberal parties have an 
outspoken feminist gender ideology, so it is possible that they attract more feminist women voters. 
The two Christian democratic parties on the other hand adopt a more equivocal stance on gender 
issues, combining positions that at times support feminist policy interventions and at other times 
advocating traditional gender roles, which arguably allows them to attract the votes of right-leaning 
women in their respective countries. 
Some of the control variables also show significant results. In line with other studies 
predicting party choice, we find that left parties draw significantly less from the support of married 
respondents and older (age 55+) voters. These voters have a higher chance of voting for a right-wing 
party. The gender ideology of the right party does not play a role here: married and older voters do 
not prefer a traditional right party over a feminist right party (or vice versa). Decreasing levels of 
political efficacy and interest decrease the chance that voters cast a vote for a feminist (either left or 
right) party; they instead opt for a right party with a traditional gender ideology. Age plays a role, 
with the oldest category of respondents (age 55+) having a significantly higher chance of voting for a 
right party with a traditional gender ideology.  
Table 4 finally shows the same model but with an interaction effect between gender and 
age. The results show that especially younger women have a higher chance of voting for a left party 
with a feminist gender ideology. This confirms the gender-generation gap (Norris, 1999), namely that 
especially younger women are drawn to leftist, feminist parties. Right parties with a feminist gender 
ideology remain more attractive to women in general than right parties with a traditional gender 
ideology.  
Table 3 and 4 about here 
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Discussion 
 
The exploratory analysis conducted in this article is a first step towards bringing party behaviour, 
particularly party ideology, into studies of gender and electoral support for rightist parties. We show 
evidence of rightist parties who adopt feminist gender ideologies succeeding in securing more 
women’s votes than rightist parties who espouse traditional gender ideologies. Future research 
should add more data points from across time and space. Changes in party gender ideologies over 
time might be measured through the systematic analysis of party manifestos and leaders’ speeches, 
which would triangulate our findings from expert survey evidence- reducing the risk of bias and 
path-dependency in the measurements, and  allow us to investigate the relationship between 
political leadership and the gender gap. Our findings suggest that such research would be a fruitful 
endeavour for subsequent study. Here we were able to demonstrate that there is considerable 
variation in the gender ideologies of rightist parties; with many mainstream parties of the right 
competing with parties of the left over what we might consider feminist and liberal ideological 
space. Although the general trend for leftist parties to be more feminist and liberal than parties of 
the right holds, there is nonetheless considerable competition between parties of the left and the 
right that might be suggestive of rightist party attempts to represent feminist women.  We find, in 
other words, that political parties can combine feminism with rightist economic ideologies. Parties of 
the populist radical right overall adopt more traditional gender ideologies than parties of the 
mainstream right, even though there is some variation. Although the literature has identified a shift 
toward more feminist positions among some elements of the PRR, particularly in Northern Europe, 
these parties remain considerably less feminist in their values than many other parties of the right. 
Notably, we found only one example of a PRR party with a feminist gender ideology score (PVV in 
the Netherlands).   
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How much attention a party gives to gender issues is best understood as determined by 
their overall position on the libertarian-authoritarian scale rather than linked to their position on 
gender equality per se. This confirms extant literature that suggests that rightist parties that 
combine laissez-faire economic values with liberal moral values are most likely to adopt feminist 
positions. In terms of attracting women voters we find that rightist parties who adopt a feminist 
gender ideology are able to attract more women voters than other parties of the right. These are 
mostly centre-right parties such as the Christian democratic CD&V in Belgium and the 
Kristdemokraterna in Sweden, and the liberal parties Centerpartiet in Sweden and the Swedish 
People’s Party of Finland. The two Christian democratic parties specifically combine feminist and 
traditional elements in their gender ideology, which arguably allows them to attract right-leaning 
women voters. 
We have explored the role that party ideology plays in gender differences in party support 
and shown that there is considerable variation in how parties combine economic, moral and gender 
ideologies that is, in turn, related to their recruitment of women voters. Future studies of the 
international gender gap in left-right party support should gather systematic information about 
party positioning to incorporate into explanatory models aimed at deriving more convincing 
accounts of how and why gender gaps vary across time and space. 
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Figure 1: Mean gender ideology of rightist, PRR and leftist parties in Europe 
 
Note: Gender ideology is measured on an 11-point scale, with 0 indicating a feminist gender ideology 
and 10 indicating a traditional gender ideology 
Figure 2: Correlations between gender ideology and economic vs liberal/authoritarian (gal/tan) 
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Figure 3: Percentage of women in the electorate of leftist and rightist parties 
 
Note: For leftist parties: N=44; Mean=49.4; Standard Deviation=8.6; Min=25, Max=69.4. For rightist 
parties: N=49; Mean=48.5; Standard Deviation=11; Min=27.3, Max=75. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of women in the electorate of populist versus non-populist right parties 
 
(The number of respondents who supported the PRR was less than 50 in Belgium, Italy and the UK)  
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List of Tables 
Table 1: Experts and Political Parties included in the survey 
Country Experts Parties 
Austria 5 9 
Belgium 8 16 
Denmark 5 7 
Finland 5 8 
France 3 13 
Germany 10 9 
Ireland 6 10 
Italy 6 12 
Netherlands 6 10 
Norway 3 9 
Portugal 4 11 
Spain 6 15 
Sweden 5 11 
Switzerland 6 12 
United Kingdom 5 18 
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Table 2: OLS regression of gender ideology of rightist parties 
 Model 1 - Gender ideology 
B (S.E.) 
Intercept .582 (1.636) 
Socialist/laissez-faire .034 (.186) 
Libertarian/authoritarian .593 (.113)*** 
Populist right party .666 (.644) 
Adjusted R2 .567 
N 42 
Note: the B-coefficients are unstandardized coefficients. ***p<0.001; + p<0.1. VIF scores range from 
1.211 to 1.67, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in either model. 
 
 
Table 3: Multinomial Logistic Regression predicting party choice by gender ideology 
 Vote for left party with feminist 
gender ideology  
B (S.E.) 
Vote for right party with 
feminist gender ideology 
B (S.E.) 
Intercept 1.635 (.169)*** 2.169 (.182)*** 
Gender (=female) .384 (.061)*** .282 (.065)*** 
Marital status (= not married) .157 (.064)* -.074 (.069) 
Employment (=paid employed) -.017 (.069) -.104 (.074) 
Age (in categories) 
16/18-39 year 
40-54 year 
 
.303 (.08)*** 
.175 (.081)* 
 
.107 (.087) 
-.095 (.088) 
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Political efficacy -.382 (.043)*** -.651 (.048)*** 
Political interest -.140 (.034)*** -.134 (.037)*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .208 
N 9410 
Note: The model is a fixed effect model with country dummies. Reference category is ‘vote for right 
party with traditional gender ideology’. The fourth category ‘vote for left party with traditional 
gender ideology’ remains empty and is therefore not included in the Table. the B-coefficients are 
unstandardized coefficients. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.  
 
Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regression predicting party choice by gender ideology, with interaction 
effects 
 Vote for left party with feminist 
gender ideology  
B (S.E.) 
Vote for right party with 
feminist gender ideology 
B (S.E.) 
Intercept 1.647 (.171)*** 2.181 (.184)*** 
Gender (=female) .346 (.086)*** .260 (.090)** 
Marital status (= not married) .170 (.065)** -.070 (.070) 
Employment (=paid employed) -.018 (.069) -.106 (.074) 
Age (in categories) 
16/18-39 year 
40-54 year 
 
.152 (.109) 
.245 (.108)* 
 
.089 (.116) 
-.124 (.117) 
Political efficacy -.383 (.043)*** -.652 (.048)*** 
Political interest -.138 (.034)*** -.135 (.037)*** 
Female*16/18-39 year 
Female*40-54 year 
.296 (.149)* 
-.138 (.145) 
.049 (.162) 
.050 (.156) 
30 
 
Nagelkerke R2 .210 
N 9410 
Note: The model is a fixed effect model with country dummies. Reference category is ‘vote for right 
party with traditional gender ideology’. The fourth category ‘vote for left party with traditional 
gender ideology’ remains empty and is therefore not included in the Table. the B-coefficients are 
unstandardized coefficients. ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
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Appendix 1. Response rates for countries in European Election Survey 2014 
Country N (net interviews) Response rates 
Austria 1114 75% 
Belgium 1084 62% 
Denmark 1085 46% 
Finland 1096 68% 
France 1074 59% 
Germany 1648 63% 
Ireland 1081 77% 
Italy 1091 52% 
Netherlands 1101 38% 
Portugal 1033 84% 
Spain 1106 76% 
Sweden 1144 52% 
United Kingdom 1421 41% 
Source: EES 2014; Popa et al 2015. 
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Appendix 2. Comparison between gender expert survey scores and scores by Akkerman (2015) 
 Score Akkerman 
2015 
(-1 – 1) 
Score expert 
survey 
(0 – 10) 
PVV (Netherlands) 0 3.83 
Vlaams Belang (Belgium) 1 8.2 
FPO (Austria) 0.77 7.8 
Front National (France) 1 7.67 
Danish People’s Party (Denmark) 0.37 6.2 
Note: Akkerman scores (2015) show the average position of the populist radical right parties on 
family relations in the most recent national election (PVV, FN and DF in 2012; VB in 2010; FPO in 
2011), based on election manifestos. Scores range between -1 indicating a liberal position and +1 
indicating a conservative position (Akkerman 2015). 
                                                          
i
 A notable exception is Mudde & Kaltwasser (2015). 
ii
 The term gender would not have been used by these authors at the time.  
iii
 Men can of course espouse feminist gender ideologies but we argue that gender ideology is more likely to be 
a highly salient issue that might affect vote choice for women rather than men.  
iv
 Ideally we would have translated all of the surveys into the country experts’ native languages but we had 
insufficient resources to do this satisfactorily. We printed the party names in native languages and contacted 
experts who were proficient in English.  
v
 We ran our models excluding France and Portugal and our findings were robust to their exclusion. The 
analysis is available from the authors on request.  
vi
 The full survey is available in the online appendix to this paper. 
vii
 Except for Austria, where respondents were 16 years or older. 
viii
 Face-to-face interviews were conducted between May 30 and June 27 2014. 
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ix
 In line with the EES dataset, only parties are included that have at least one seat in either the national 
assembly or in the European parliament. 
x
 Data from the European Elections Survey (EES) are available on the website of the Cologne-based GESIS Data 
Archive for the Social Sciences: 
https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=5160&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.12300 
xi
 In line with previous studies (Ferrin, Fraile, Garcia-Albacete 2017) we find that women are somewhat more 
likely than men to tick the ‘Refuse’ or ‘Don’t know’ box when asked about future voting intentions. We 
acknowledge this as a potential methodological problem of survey research. Important for our study however 
is that the gender gap in the use of the ‘Don’t know/Refuse’ option is not larger for the question on future 
voting intentions than for the question on actual (past) voting behaviour. 
xii
 Scale composed of two items ‘The (nationality parliament) takes the concerns of (nationality) citizens into 
consideration’ and ‘You trust the (nationality parliament)’. Answer categories: 1-Yes totally, 2-Yes, somewhat, 
3-No, not really, 4-No, not at all. Cronbach’s alpha = .823. 
xiii Question wording: 'You are very interested in politics’. Answer categories: 1-Yes, definitely, 2-Yes, to some 
extent, 3-No, not really, 4-No, not at all. 
xiv In 2015, Akkerman conducted a study of the positions of five PRR parties on family relations based on 
election manifestos. In appendix 2, we compare her results to the results of the gender expert survey and find 
that the scores are remarkably similar
xiv
. In both studies, PVV in the Netherlands displays a more liberal 
position on family relations and a more progressive stance on gender equality compared to the other parties. 
Three parties – Vlaams Belang (Belgium), FPO (Austria) and FN (France) – stand out as the most conservative 
ones, in relation to their stance on family relations as well as their stance on gender equality. 
xv
 We removed outliers. 
xvi
 In Belgium, the UK and Italy there were under 50 PRR voters- given these small sample sizes we cannot draw 
inferences about the proportion of women voters for the PRR in these countries using the ESS.  
xvii
 Parties with a ‘feminist’ gender ideology scored 5 or higher on the gender ideology scale. Parties with a 
‘traditional’ ideology scored less than 5 on the gender ideology scale. 
